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Abstract: A major issuance of special drawing rights (SDRs) through the Inter-
national Monetary Fund would be a key tool to provide financial support to
developing and emerging economies and limit the economic and financial fallout
of the COVID-19 crisis. SDRs are an unconditional resource, and the case for such
an allocation is very strong during an exogenous shock, such as the current one.
An SDR allocation would enhance the international liquidity in the hands of
emerging and developing countries, so that public responses to the health crisis
are not imperilled by financial crises. Close to two-fifths of a new SDR allocation
would directly go to developing and emerging economies. In addition, a new
mechanism should be created through which countries that do not need their SDR
allocation lend them to the IMF, to increase the Fund’s lending capacity. Devel-
oped countries can also allocate the SDRs they do not use for official development
assistance.
Keywords: special drawing rights, international monetary fund, COVID-19, global
financial safety net, G-20
The COVID-19 pandemic is having dramatic effects on the global economy. It has
led to a shut-down of borders, a collapse of tourism and international passenger
travel, a disruption of global trade and investment, and a sharp contraction of
economic activity all over the world. Developing and emerging economies have
also been hit by the largest-ever outflow of portfolio capital, crumbling commodity
prices, a contraction of remittances, and depreciation of their currencies. As of 20
April, 103 developing countries have approached the International Monetary Fund
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(IMF) for emergency financing. IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva has
referred to the effects of COVID-19 as “the worst economic fallout since the Great
Depression”. Both the IMF and UNCTAD reckon that emerging market and
developing countries have an immediate need of $2.5 trillion.
When the COVID-19 pandemic put global financial markets into freefall in
early March 2020, major advanced country central banks intervened quickly to
stabilisemarkets. Importantly, theUnited States Federal Reserve stepped in swiftly
and launched swap facilities with other central banks (Tooze 2020). But with the
exception of Brazil and Mexico, these benefited only advanced economy central
banks. The Fed also created a repo facility through which central banks can cash
Treasury bonds, but this facility only benefits countries with large foreign ex-
change reserves. The rest of the emerging and developing world is left to fend for
itself.
The crisis has once again shown the fragility of the global financial system. It
has also exposed the inadequacy of the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), the
multi-layered system comprising nations’ foreign exchange reserves, bilateral
central bank swap lines, and the financial resources of global financial in-
stitutions, particularly the IMF and regional financial arrangements (RFAs). As we
have laid out elsewhere, there is an urgent need to reform and expand the GFSN in
response to COVID-19 (Gallagher et al. 2020). The IMF’s current firepower of $1
trillion – parts of which are already committed – will not be enough to support its
membership through this crisis. Several measures – including the issuance of at
least $500 billion of IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs); a further improvement of
the IMF’s precautionary and emergency facilities; the establishment of a multi-
lateral swap facility at the IMF; an increase of the resources and geographic
coverage of RFAs; a coordinated approach to capital flow management measures;
and significant debt relief – should be implemented very quickly.
To date, however, the international community – and the Group of 20 (G-20)
leading economies in particular – has not been able to agree on such measures
(Ocampo 2020), despite the commitment of G-20 leaders “to do whatever it takes
and to use all available policy tools to minimize the economic and social damage
from the pandemic, restore global growth, maintain market stability, and
strengthen resilience”. At the April 2020 Spring Meetings of the IMF and theWorld
Bank, member countries could only agree on a doubling of the IMF’s emergency
facilities to 100 billion dollars and the creation of a short-term liquidity line – a
kind of swap credit line – “for member countries with very strong policies and
fundamentals”, a rule that in the past has been applied to very few countries. The
G-20 also agreed on a temporary debt standstill during 2020 for the debt service on
official credits for the poorest 77 countries, a step that has already been charac-
terized as insufficient.
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This is in sharp contrast to the “Global Plan for Recovery and Reform” adopted
by the G-20 in London in April 2009, which paved the way to the most important
reformof IMF credit lines in history, the largest issue of SDRs, a capitalization and a
massive increase in lending by multilateral development banks, an ambitious
coordinated reform of financial prudential regulations, and the beginning of an
effort to strengthen global tax cooperation.
It is particularly worrying that no consensus could be reached on an issuance
of SDRs. SDRs are international monetary assets issued by the IMF – acting, in a
sense, as a kind of central bank of the world. SDRs are based on a basket of
international currencies comprising the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the euro, the
pound sterling and the Chinese renminbi. The IMF has the authority to create
unconditional liquidity through “general allocations” of SDRs to all itsmembers in
proportion to their quotas – or shares – in the IMF.
New SDRswill become additional international reserves of countries, and they
can be sold or used for payments to other central banks. A major SDR issuance
would be a key tool to provide financial support to developing and emerging
economies and limit the economic and financial fallout. An SDR allocation would
enhance the international liquidity in the hands of emerging and developing
countries, which are the primary users of SDRs. SDRs are an unconditional
resource, and the case for such an allocation is very strong during an exogenous
shock, such as the current one. Critics worry that countries could use them as a
substitute for “sound policies”, mixing structural adjustment and austerity.
However, a global health emergency and liquidity crunch is not the time for those
policies, but rather for the massive counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies
that are being adopted by advanced countries.
In fact, it has been long argued that SDRs should be allocated in a counter-
cyclical way, as it is during crises that countries need additional reserves. Indeed,
the conditions that the IMF’s Articles of Agreement (the IMF’s charter) lays out for
SDR allocations can be made – “namely that general allocations of SDRs should
meet a long-term global need to supplement existing reserve assets in a manner
that will promote the attainment of the IMF’s purposes and avoid economic
stagnation and deflation, as well as excess demand and inflation” – are currently
met.
A new, large-scale SDR allocation (which we proposed early on in a number of
publications) was not only supported by the IMF Managing Director, the Inter-
governmental Group of 24 and other low andmiddle-income countries, but also by
leaders of major European economies. The issuance of SDRs was blocked by two
G-20 members – the US and India. A new SDR allocation would require an 85%
vote, which means a positive vote by the U.S., which holds 16.51% of the voting
rights and is hence able to veto any decision at the IMF. During the IMF andWorld
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Bank spring meetings, US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin argued that SDRs
were “not an effective tool to respond to urgent needs” and argued that “almost
70% of an allocation would be provided to G-20 countries, most of which do not
need, and would not use additional SDRs to respond to the crisis. By contrast, all
low-income countries, including those facing urgent balance of payment needs,
would receive just 3% of any allocation” (FT 2020).
Mnuchin is right that, given an SDR allocation would be distributed according
to IMF quotas, only parts of the allocated SDRs would go to developing and
emerging economies. However, the SDRs that would benefit these countries would
account for close to two-fifths of the allocation. This is certainly too low, and
reasonwhy reform of IMF quotas and the rules according to which SDR allocations
are distributed are necessary. Yet a new SDR issuance is the only case in which
these countries share in the “seignorage” of creating international money. More-
over, ways can be found to allocate more SDRs to those who need them. For
instance, as we have suggested, a new mechanism should be created by (high-
income) countries who would agree to lend the SDRs that they do not use to the
IMF, to increase the Fund’s lending capacity. Developed countries can also allo-
cate the SDRs they do not use for official development assistance. And, crucially,
developed countries should be ready to exchange SDRs for their national cur-
rencies – dollars, euros, or other internationally-accepted money.
So why do the US and India opposes a new SDR allocation? The problem
appears to be that all IMFmember countries get a share in the allocation, including
countries with which the US and Indian administrations are not on friendly terms.
In particular, the US worries about a liquidity boost for Iran and Venezuela,
countries on which the US has imposed economic sanctions, while India is
opposing an SDR allocation because it would benefit its arch-rival Pakistan. But
these bilateral tensions should not hinder a collective global response to the crisis.
Some have also argued that SDRs could rival the role of the USD as the global
lead currency, and that the US is hence hostile to SDR issuances. We should
remember, however, that the US was not only a great supporter of the creation of
SDRs in the 1960s, but also of later allocations, and notably that of 2009. There is
no reasonwhy the US should see an SDR allocation as antagonistic to its role in the
global monetary system, which will continue to be dominated by US dollar assets.
It is also worth pointing out that the support of the US administration for an
SDR allocation would not be imperilled by domestic politics. To avoid authoriza-
tion by Congress, the allocation to the US must be below the US quota, which
means that the total permissible new allocation would be equal to the total quotas
in the Fund –which is SDR 477 billion (USD 653 billion at May 1st exchange rates).
There have been no SDR allocations within the current “basic period”, 5 years after
4 K. Gallagher et al.
January 2017, so SDRs outstanding (SDR 204 billion) would not count against the
permissible amount.
COVID-19 does not discriminate between rich and poor countries, and until the
virus is eradicated it will imperil the health of the world’s people and the global
economy alike. The international community needs to extend support so that
public responses to the health crisis are not imperilled by financial crises. The
international community missed the chance to agree on an SDR allocation this
April. It should reverse the mistake and adopt this decision, which is urgent in the
midst of the greatest economic crisis of generations. This is a time for bold thinking
and action. An SDR allocation is not a silver bullet, and it needs to be com-
plemented by further measures, as mentioned above. All solutions have trade-offs
and limitations, but we hold that a large SDR allocation should be part of the
solution.
An SDR issuance should also be the beginning of a deep discussion about the
role of SDRs in the internationalmonetary system. Theywere created half a century
ago and constitute the only true global money, backed by all IMF members.
However, it has remained as one of most under-utilised instruments of interna-
tional cooperation. They should be issued regularly in proportion to the increase in
the global demand for foreign exchange reserves. Beyond that, they should
become the major instrument, or even the only instrument, to finance IMF pro-
grams. Indeed, the IMF should entirely become an SDR-based institution, as
proposed by Jacques Polak, its then chief economist, four decades ago.
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